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NOTES

WHY DOMA AND NOT ENDA?: A REVIEW
OF RECENT FEDERAL HOSTILITY TO
EXPAND EMPLOYMENT RIGHTS AND
PROTECTION BEYOND
TRADITIONAL NOTIONS
I.

INTRODUCTION

Approximately thirty years have passed since Martin Luther
King, Jr. lead thousands of African-Americans on a march to Washington, and Rosa Parks decided to sit in the front of the bus. Yet, as
the fight by African-Americans to end racial discrimination in the
workplace continues in the midst of great strides, another minority
group still fights for a federal foothold.
Gays and lesbians 'in the United States have suffered years of
employment related discrimination simply because of their sexual
orientation.' In fact, private employers have discriminated against
gay men and lesbians by firing, and refusing to hire or promote
homosexuals simply because of their sexual orientation, with impunity.2 For example, an employer can fire a gay employee, simply
because another employee feels uncomfortable about working with
homosexuals;3 an employer can fire a heterosexual employee
1. See The Employment Non-DiscriminationAc 1996: Hearingson H.R. 1863 Before

the Subcomm. on Government Programs of the House Comm. on Small Businesses, 104th
Cong. 7 (1996) (statement of Rep. Gerry E. Studds).
2. See Norma M. Riccucci & Charles W. Gossett, Employment Discriminationin State
and Local Government: The Lesbian and Gay Male Experience, 26 AM. Rnv. PUB. ADnmi.

175 (1996).
3. See The Employment Non-DiscriminationAct, 1996: Hearings on H.R. 1863 Before
the Subcomm. on Government Programs of the House Comm. on Small Businesses, 104th

Cong. 30-31 (1996) (statement of Todd M. Dobson).

A computer consultant from

Massachusetts was fired from his job when his employer had to make a choice between him
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because her foster child is a lesbian;4 and an employer can refuse to
hire a gay applicant even though he exhibits the highest qualifications for employment, on the basis of his sexual orientation. 5 In
each of these instances, the victims have had no federal legal
recourse.

6

As a result of these, and numerous other instances of employment discrimination, gays and lesbians have fought to secure governmentally mandated protection. Yet, even in the midst of recent
success in several state legislatures,7 and in the U.S. Supreme
Court,8 gays and lesbians have been unsuccessful in the federal
sphere in securing employment rights and anti-discrimination protection, specifically in the form of a federal statutory ban on
employment discrimination based on sexual orientation. 9 Nor have
they been successful in persuading federal courts to apply preexisting federal anti-discrimination
statutes, i.e. Title VII, to sexual
10
orientation discrimination.
and a fellow worker who did not feel comfortable working with a gay man, despite an
excellent work record. See id.
4. See The Employment Non-DiscriminationAct, 1996: Hearingson H.R. 1863 Before
the Subcomm. on Government Programs of the House Comm. on Small Businesses, 104th
Cong. 36 (1996) (statement of Karen Solon). Karen Solon was terminated from her
employment at a child development center because her foster daughter was a lesbian, even
though she has been commended by her community for exceptional service and work with
special children, by receiving the Fairfax County Office for Children Award. See id.
5. See The Employment Non-DiscriminationAct, 1996: Hearings on H.R. 1863 Before
the Subcomm. on Government Programs of the House Comm. on Small Businesses, 104th
Cong. 25-26 (1996) (statement of Michael Proto). A college graduate with a masters in
criminal justice, who was seeking employment as a police officer with the Hamden,
Connecticut Police Dept., after receiving the highest score on a civil service test, and ranking
in the top seven among all candidates, was ultimately passed up for consideration after a
polygraph test disclosed that he was gay. See id.
6. See Norma M. Riccucci & Charles W. Gossett, Employment Discriminationin State
and Local Government: The Lesbian and Gay Male Experience, 26 AM. REv. Pun. ADMiN.
175 (1996).
7. See Statutory Protectionfor Gays and Lesbiansin PrivateEmployment, 109 HARv. L.
REv. 1625, 1626 (1996). Nine states and the District of Columbia have passed statutes
banning discrimination because of one's sexual orientation in employment. See id.
8. See Romer v. Evans,-U.S. -, 116 S.Ct. 1620 (1996) (holding that Colorado's
constitutional amendment prohibiting statutory protections based on sexual orientation,
violated the equal protection clause of the U.S. Constitution).
9. See Charles R. Calleros, The Meaning of "Sex" Homosexual and Bisexual Harassment Under Title VII, 20 VT. L. REv. 55 (1995).
10. See id. Title VII's ban on employment discrimination based on sex, has been
judicially interpreted in an attempt to stay true to legislative history, as to only apply to
gender based discrimination, in order to insure equality in employment for women and men,
and not to sexual orientation discrimination. See id.
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One recent setback for gays and lesbians in securing national protection against discrimination, is the failure of the passage of the
Employment Non-Discrimination Act in the fall of 1996, by one
Senate vote," which would have
prohibited sexual orientation dis2
employment.'
in
crimination
The passage of the Defense of Marriage Act in 1996 represents
another setback recently suffered by gays and lesbians. This act
defines the term "marriage" for all federal laws and statutes, to
mean only a union between a man and a woman, and the term
"spouse" as only a person of the opposite sex. 3 The Defense of
Marriage Act also effectively defines the term spouse in the Family
and Medical Leave Act,' 4 which provides employees up to twelve
weeks of unpaid leave from their job to care for a seriously ill
spouse.' 5
Traditionally, Congress has left the definition of marriage up to
the states.' 6 However, given the likelihood that Hawaii may eventually legalize same-sex marriages, and thereby entitle married gay
and lesbian couples to all the employment related benefits that
same-sex marriage would provide,' Congress passed the Defense
of Marriage Act to permit the states not to recognize same sex marriages from other states, and to define the terms "marriage" and
11. See Discrimination:Senate Rejects by 50-49 Bill to Ban Job Bias Based on Sexual
Orientation,Employment Policy & Law Daily (BNA) (Sept. 12, 1996) at 11.
12. See 142 CONG. REc. S10,135 (daily ed. Sept. 10, 1996) (statement of Sen. Kennedy).
13. See 1 U.S.C. § 7 (1996).
In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or of any ruling,
regulation, or interpretation of the various administrative bureaus and agencies
of the United States, the word "marriage" means only a legal union between
one man and one woman as husband and wife, and the word "spouse" refers
only to a person of the opposite sex who is a husband or a wife.
Id.
14. See 29 U.S.C. § 2611 (1996). "The term 'spouse' means a husband or wife, as the
case may be." Id.
15. See 29 U.S.C. § 2612 (1996).
16. H.R. RaP. No. 104-664, at 2 (1996).
17. See Baehr v. Miike,--P.2d -, 1996 WL 694235 (Haw. Ct. App. 1996) (holding on
remand from the Hawaii Supreme Court, that the state's health department, charged with
processing applications for marriage licenses, failed to demonstrate a compelling state
interest to deny marriage licenses to same sex couples); Gays' Right to Marry Upheld,
NEWSDAY, Dec. 4, 1996, at A5 (stating that the appellate court's decision has been stayed,
pending a final appeal to the Hawaii State Supreme Court). This final appeal is expected to
be affirmed by those members in Congress who introduced the Defense of Marriage Act. See
H.R. REP. No. 104-664, at 2 (1996).
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"spouse" for all federal acts and laws.' 8 The effect such a statute
would have includes denying same-sex married couples from benefiting from the same rights guaranteed to heterosexual married
couples under the Family and Medical Leave Act.19
This Note explores these recent setbacks for gays and lesbians in
securing federally mandated protection against sexual orientation
employment discrimination in the U.S. It will also include a discussion of the potential effects the Defense of Marriage Act would
have on the availability of the Family and Medical Leave Act on
married gay and lesbian couples should Hawaii legalize same-sex
marriage. Part II will address the federal court debate of Title VII
applicability to sexual orientation discrimination in the workplace.
Part III will begin with a discussion of the recent trend in several
states which have passed anti-discrimination statutes banning sexual orientation discrimination in employment, and develop into a
comprehensive exploration of the Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 1996 (ENDA). Part IV will address the Defense of
Marriage Act (DOMA) and its effect on the Family and Medical
Leave Act (FMLA) should same-sex marriage become legal in
Hawaii. This Note will conclude that the only viable way gays and
lesbians can truly secure anti-discrimination rights in the workplace,
is with the passage of a federal statute prohibiting sexual orientation discrimination in employment,20 which would be in accord
with the general edicts of this nation's values of liberty and freedom. In addition, the Note will conclude that DOMA's arbitrary
nature and application as well as its effect on the FMLA, requires
that Congress either repeal the definition section of the DOMA, or
at least amend it in order to exclude its applicability to the FMLA.
18. See H.R. REP. No. 104-664, at 2 (1996) (stating explicitly that the Defense of
Marriage Act was passed in order to prevent the imposition of same-sex marriage on those
states which prohibit it, because of the judicial interpretation of one state's marriage laws by
its highest court).
19. See id. at 8.
20. See Discrimination:Senate Rejects by 50-49 Bill to Ban Job Bias Based on Sexual

Orientation, Employment Policy & Law Daily (BNA) (Sept. 12, 1996). Given the narrow
defeat of ENDA, Sen. Kennedy stated that it will be re-introduced in the Senate in the
beginning of Congress's next term. See id. See also The Civil Rights Amendments Act of
1998, H.R. 365, 105th Cong. (1997). In January 1997, Rep. Towns introduced a bill into the
House of Representatives that would add sexual orientation to the list of protected classes
against employment discrimination in ittle VII, and is essentially the same in substance as
the Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 1996, the subject of this Note. See id.
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II. TITLE V1i's INAPPLICABILITY TOWARDS
SEXUAL ORIENTATION

Ever since the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was enacted, gays and
lesbians have attempted to get the judiciary to include, within its
prohibition against employment discrimination based on sex,2 1 a
sub-category of prohibition with regard to sexual orientation. 2
However, as will be illustrated below, this attempt has been futile,
and has met strong opposition in the federal courts.
A.

DeSantis v. Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co., the
Seminal Case

Any discussion concerning Title VII's inapplicability to sexual
orientation discrimination must begin with DeSantis v. Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co., 3 the seminal case in this area. In DeSantis,
three males filed suit in federal court claiming that their rights
against discrimination under Title VII were violated.2 4 Robert
DeSantis alleged that he was refused employment with the Pacific
Telephone & Telegraph Co. (PT&T), because he was a homosexual.2' Bernard Boyle, another plaintiff in the suit, claimed he had
to quit his job with PT&T because he feared his life was in danger
26
from gay related harassment he received from his co-workers.
The third named plaintiff in the suit, Simard, claimed that harassment from his supervisors, similar to what Boyle experienced, also
forced him to leave PT&T.2 7
All three men filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), claiming that PT&T had violated Title
VII's ban on sex discrimination in employment."8 However, the
21. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1996).
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-(1) to fail or
refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin ....
IM (emphasis added).
22. See Charles R. Calleros, The Meaning of "Sex". Homosexual and Bisexual
Harassment Under Title VII, 20 VT. L. REv. 55 (1995).
23. 608 F.2d 327 (9th Cir. 1979).
24. See id. at 328-29.

25.
26.
27.
28.

See id.
See DeSantis, 608 F.2d at 328.
See id.
See id
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EEOC rejected their petition for lack of jurisdiction.2 9 The men
then initiated a Title VII class action suit in federal district court,
which was dismissed, also for lack of jurisdiction.3 0 The Ninth Circuit for the Court of Appeals affirmed the EEOC's and the district
court's decisions, and held on appeal that Title VII does not cover
sexual orientation discrimination in the workplace. 3
On appeal, the men argued that Congress intended to incorporate a prohibition on sexual orientation discrimination within the
general prohibition against discrimination based on sex. 3 2 Specifically, they argued that "discrimination against homosexuals disproportionately effects men and that this disproportionate impact and
correlation between discrimination on the basis of sexual preference and discrimination on the basis of 'sex' requires that sexual
preference' 33be considered a sub category of the 'sex' category of
Title VII.
Nevertheless, this argument was dismissed by the
Court.
The Court reasoned that the legislative history of Title VII only
intended that the "traditional notions of sex" be applied when
interpreting Title VII's discrimination prohibition based on one's
sex. 34 The Court additionally rejected the plaintiff's disparate
impact argument, by saying that Congress's failed attempts to incorporate sexual orientation discrimination within Title VII, is evidence of Congress's intent to have a narrow definition of sexual
discrimination that does not include sexual orientation. 35 Furthermore, by following its own decision in Holloway v. Arthur Andersen
& Co.,36 the Court held that Title VII's prohibition against sex discrimination applies only to discrimination on the basis of gender to ensure that men and women are treated equally in the workplace
- and should not be extended to include sexual preference such as
homosexuality. 37 Moreover, the Court stated that the plaintiff's disparate impact theory cannot be used to "bootstrap" Title VII pro29. See DeSantis, 608 F.2d at 328.

30. See id.
31. See id.
32. See id. at 328-29.
33. DeSantis, 608 F.2d at 329.

34. See id.
35. See id.
36. 566 F.2d 659 (9th Cir. 1977) (holding that Title VII sex discrimination protection
does not include transsexuals).
37. See DeSantis, 608 F.2d at 329-30.
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tection to homosexuals, because doing so would frustrate
Congressional intent regarding homosexuals, and thereby reach
beyond the confines of judicial responsibility into the realm of judicial legislation, a form of judicial activism courts should restrain
themselves from engaging in.3
The same reasoning enunciated above, was also used by the
Court to dismiss the plaintiffs contention that PT&T violated Title
VII by having a different set of hiring criteria for men and women,
by requiring that men have female partners and women have male
partners, for sexual relations. 9 The basic argument for the plaintiffs was that this violated the Supreme Court's warning in Phillips
v. Martin-Marietta Corp.,4 saying that it will not permit an
employer to have different hiring policies for men and women.41
Nonetheless, the Court dismissed the argument, saying that the
employer is not differentiating his hiring policies based on sex, but
rather uses the same criteria for both sexes - "it will not hire or
promote a person who prefers sexual partners of the same sex."4 2

The final argument purported by the plaintiffs, that PT&T's hiring policy interfered with their right of association, was also
rejected by the Court. The EEOC has held that an employer violates Title VII where an employee is fired for having friends of a
particular race, because such conduct amounts to discrimination
because of race.43 The plaintiffs relied upon this, and contended
that "analogously discrimination because of the sex of the employees' sexual partner should constitute discrimination based on
sex." 44 The Court rejected this argument, because the employer's
policies did not discriminate against employees because of the gender of their friends, but rather discriminates against employees who
have a particular kind of relationship with the same sex, i.e. a
homosexual relationship.45 Therefore, since Title VII does not
apply to sexual orientation discrimination because it would violate
Congressional intent, the plaintiff's "interference with association"
argument failed, as it would "bootstrap" Title VII protection to sex38. See id. at 330.
39. See id. at 331.
40. 400 U.S. 542 (1971).
41. See id. at 544.

42.
43.
44.
45.

See
See
See
See

DeSantis, 608 F.2d at 331.
id.
id.
id.
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ual orientation.46 Thus, the DeSantis Court declined to interpret
Title VII's protection against sex discrimination, to apply to sexual
orientation as well.
B. DeSantis'sProgeny
The DeSantis decision was followed by a line of federal cases
which have all served to buttress the reasoning of its opinion, and
its ultimate holding.
In Smith v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co.,47 the appellate court
affirmed the district court's dismissal of claims of Title VII racial
and sex discrimination, where the plaintiff's application for employment with the defendant was declined because the interviewer
thought that Smith was effeminate, and therefore a homosexual. 4
Although Smith argued that the law prohibits an "employer to
reject a job applicant based on his or her affectional or sexual preference,"49 the Court reasoned the Civil Rights Act of 1964 does not
forbid such discrimination. 50 The Court reasoned as the DeSantis
Court did, that Congress intended that Title VII's prohibition
against sexual discrimination only be applied to guarantee equal job
opportunities for males and females, and thus does not extend to
protection against sexual orientation discrimination. 51
In Blum v. Gulf Oil Corp.,5' the circuit court affirmed the district
court's denial of relief under Title VII. 53 The plaintiff's claim was
that he was unlawfully discharged from his employment by his former employer, Gulf Oil Corp., because of his religion and sexual
preference, although Blum was granted several raises, and given
time off to observe the Jewish holidays.54 The employer claimed
that he was discharged for violating company policy by excessively
using the company phones for personal use.55 However, Blum contended that this was all a pretext and that he was fired because he
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

See hL
569 F.2d 325 (5th Cir. 1978).
See id. at 325-26.
Id at 326.
See id
See id. at 326-27.
597 F.2d 936 (5th Cir. 1979).
See id
See id. at 937.
See id
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was Jewish, white, male and a homosexual. 56 The court held that
the discharge was not pretextual, and even if it were, the claim for
unlawful discharge because
of one's homosexuality was not pro57
tected under Title VII.
In Williamson v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc, 51 a black male
appealed from a district court's order granting summary judgment
to his former employer, A.G. Edwards and Sons, Inc., and Bruce
Morgan, his former supervisor, who discharged Williamson purportedly because of his race.59 Citing DeSantis, the appellate court
reasoned that Williamson's complaint concerned more his homosexuality as the real cause
for his termination, which is not pro60
tected under Title VIL
In Quick v. Donaldson Co.,61 the district court refused to apply
Title VII protection against sex discrimination to the plaintiff who
was harassed and physically threatened and assaulted because his
co-workers were under the false impression that he was a homosexual.62 The court applied the rationale of DeSantis to the case and
concluded that Title VII protection against gender discrimination
cannot be "judicially
extended to include sexual preferences such as
63
homosexuality.

Finally, in Sarff v. Continental Express, the plaintiff's employment with the defendant was terminated after he complained about
harassment from other employees because they thought he was
gay. 65 The court found sufficient evidence in the record to indicate
that the plaintiff was fired for due cause, as a result of poor job
performance.66 However the court went further to say that
notwithstanding the plaintiff's poor work performance, "an
employer can clearly fire an employee for being gay, and such an
employee has no statutory protection in the vast majority of states
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
1996).
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

See
See
876
See
See
895

id.
id. at 938.
F.2d 69 (8th Cir. 1989).
id.
id. at 70.
F. Supp. 1288 (S.D. Iowa 1995), rev'd on other grounds, 90 F.3d 1372 (8th Cir.

See
See
894
See
See

id. at 1289.
id. at 1297.
F. Supp. 1076 (S.D. Tex. 1995), afd, 85 F.3d 624'(5th Cir. 1996).
id.
id. at 1082-83.
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whatsoever from such action or from being harassed by a member
of his or her own sex."'67 The court reasoned that Title VII simply
does not afford an employee any protection against sexual orientation discrimination.68
C. Synthesis of the DeSantis Progeny
As the above cases illustrate, the principle argument against
applying Title VII's gender discrimination prohibition to sexual orientation, focuses on the legislative history regarding the incorporation of the gender discrimination provision within Title VII in 1964.
When the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was first introduced in Congress,
it did not contain any specific provision prohibiting sex discrimination in employment.6 9 However, this was changed in 1972 with an
amendment to the bill which added "sex" to the prohibited bases
for discrimination. 70 The debates revolving around the amendment
focused primarily on the disparate treatment between men and
women in the workplace, based on gender.7 ' Therefore, one can
easily conclude, that Congress intended that Title VII's prohibition
against sex discrimination refer only to gender based discrimination, in order to place women on equal ground with men in the
workplace, and not to sexual orientation. Given the failed effort by
gays and lesbians to apply pre-existing federal anti-discrimination
laws to sexual orientation discrimination in employment, the only
other recourse for nationwide protection is a federal statute, explicitly prohibiting such discrimination in the workplace.
III. ENDA

-

CONGRESS ATrEMPTS TO APPLY TITLE VII TO

SEXUAL ORIENTATION EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION

The Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 1996 was intro-

duced in the first session of the 104th Congress, 72 and enjoyed bi67. Id at 1081.
68. See id. at 1082.
69. See Charles R. Calleros, The Meaning of "Sex": Homosexual and Bisexual
Harassment Under Title VII, 20 VT. L. REv. 55, 56 (1995).

70. See id. at 57.
71. See id.
72. See The Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 1995, H.R. 1863, 104th Cong.
(1995); S. 2056, 104th Cong. (1996). The primary sponsors for the House Bill were Reps.

Studds and Frank. See H.R. 1863, 104th Cong. (1995). In the Senate, the primary sponsors
were Sens. Kennedy, Lieberman, and Jeffords. See S. 2056, 104th Cong. (1996).
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partisan support.73 It would have provided, for the first time,
nationwide protection for gays and lesbians from being discriminated against on the basis of sexual orientation in employment.7 4

However, before discussing ENDA, it is first necessary and logical
to address similar protections against sexual orientation discrimina-

tion already provided to gays and lesbians by state laws, ordinances,
executive decisions, and private business, that have inspired legislation like ENDA.
A.

State and Local Government, and Private Employment Efforts

to ProhibitSexual Orientation Discrimination
Presently, only nine states and the District of Columbia have
enacted legislation which prohibit sexual orientation discrimination
in public and private employment.75 Six states have executive
orders, and 142 cities and counties have ordinances, executive
orders, or policies that extend civil rights protection to gay and lesbian employees in the public sector only.76 Although New York
does not have a general statewide ban on sexual orientation discrimination, Governor George Pataki signed an executive order
barring job discrimination against homosexuals in state agencies,
leaving private employment free to discriminate.77
73. See id.
74. See id. .
75. See CA. LAB. CODE §§ 1101, 1102, 1102.1(a) (West 1997); CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 46a81c (1997); D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-2512 (1997); HAv. REV. STAT. § 368-1 (1997); MAss. GEN.
LAWs ch. 151B, § 4 (1997); MnNN. STAT. ANN. § 363.12(1), (2) (1996); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:512 (1997); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-5-7 (1996); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21 § 495 (1996); Wis. STAT.
ANN. §111.19-111.36 (1995); see also Statutory Protectionfor Gays and Lesbians in Private
Employment, 109 HARV. L. REv. 1625, 1626 (1996) (discussing the transformation of
prohibitions against sexual orientation from the local level to the state level in 9 states, and
analyzing its effect on the gay rights movement).
76. See Norma M. Riccucci & Charles W. Gossett, Employment Discriminationin State
and Local GovernmenL The Lesbian and Gay Male Experience, 26 AM. REv. PUB. ADMiN.
175 (1996).
77. See Gary Spencer, PatakiContinues Bar to Gay Bias, N.Y.L., Apr. 10, 1996, at Al.
The executive order signed by Governor Pataki is actually a continuation of former
Governor Mario Cuomo's policy. See id. When he signed the executive order, Governor
Pataki stated that his reason for doing so, was because he believes the "ultimate philosophy
of a conservative is that the state should not discriminate and that people should be judged
by their ability or willingness to work and by their qualifications." Id. at A4. Furthermore,
after much pressure, N.Y. State Attorney General Dennis Vacco, who had previously
dropped a ban on job discrimination based on sexual orientation in his office, released a
letter stating that his office would not discriminate against homosexuals either. See id.
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1. The Importance of Local Measures to Ban Sexual
Orientation Discrimination in Employment
The passage of such state and local laws and other related measures to protect gays and lesbians from sexual orientation discrimination in employment, is important for the prospects of future state
and federal laws banning such discrimination. Such state laws are
significant developments because they provide, for the first time,
secure private employment protection for homosexuals, and have a
much broader effect than local ordinances.7" Furthermore, these
local statutes have produced a well established body of precedent
that federal courts could draw upon if Congress were ever to pass a
statute similar to those already enacted in the states previously
discussed.7 9

2. The Inadequacy of Local Measures to Ban Sexual Orientation
Discrimination in Private Employment
Yet even in those states and localities with legislation protecting
against sexual orientation discrimination in private employment, an
argument can still be made that enforcement of gay and lesbian
employment rights is questionable at best. 0 For example, in many
of those jurisdictions there is no oversight agency or office, like the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, that would serve to
enforce these statutes at all.8 ' In other words, even though there
are statutes in place which ban sexual orientation discrimination in
the workplace, they often go unenforced because the state has
failed to commission an agency to enforce those laws. 82 Further78. See Statutory Protectionfor Gays and Lesbiansin PrivateEmployment, 109 HARV. L.
REV. 1625, 1631 (1996).
79. See id. at 1625. The relevant state decisional, law, has even addressed a popular
concern among opponents of a federal law piohibiting sexual orientation discrimination in
the workplace, that such a prohibition would require private employers to provide domestic
partnership benefits for gay and lesbian employees. See id. However, the state courts have
uniformly held "that a ban on sexual orientation discrimination does not require an employer
to provide benefits to a homosexual employee's lifetime partner as the employer does for a
heterosexual employee's spouse." Id. at 1626.
80. See Norma M. Riccucci & Charles W. Gossett, Employment Discrimination in State
and Local Government The Lesbian and Gay Male Experience, 26 Am. REv. Pun. ADMIN.
175 (1996) (stating that assessing the enforcement of statutes protecting against gay bias in

employment is the next logical step in learning whether gay and lesbian rights are actually
protected in the workplace).
81, See id.
82. See id.
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more, even where there is an enforcing governmental agency, only
a very small number of complaints are ever fied, principally
because filing a sexual orientation discrimination complaint
requires the complainant to "out" himself, which may be very
risky,83 and not even be worthwhile. For instance, of those cases
that are actually litigated, they are usually decided in favor of the
employer even where the facts of the case appear to significantly
favor the complainant.8 4 Consequently, the average complainant
may not even file a complaint at all, since the risk of "outing" oneself at work is too great, and the likelihood of success is relatively
small. Therefore, even in those jurisdictions with protective statutes, ordinances, or executive orders for gay and lesbian employees, they are ineffective in protecting their employment rights.
3. Efforts by the Private Sector to Ban Sexual Orientation
Discrimination
Although state and local laws banning sexual orientation appear
to be ineffective in protecting gay and lesbian employment rights,
the private sector appears to have supplemented this deficiency, but
only to a degree. A significant number of private-sector employers have voluntarily adopted employment policies prohibiting discrimination and harassment based on sexual orientation, and have
extended health insurance and other benefits to same-sex partners. 86 Such companies include American Airlines, American
Express, AT&T, Dow Chemical, IBM, Eastman Kodak, and Walt
Disney. 87 The main impetus for such non-discrimination policies
has been that they are good for business by improving employee
83. See id.
84. See id.
85. See Even Without Legislative Mandate, Workplaces Are Friendlierfor Gays, WEST's

LEGAL NEWS, Sept. 18, 1996, available in 1996 WL 524413. But see Debrah L. Rode, AntiGay Prejudice Persists in Legal Workplace, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 16, 1996, at A15 (stating that
recent surveys from the California State Bar and local bars in New York and San Francisco,
indicate that a majority of gay and lesbian lawyers feel that their sexual orientation has
negatively affected their careers, and that gay lawyers earn less income and are less likely to

become partner than their heterosexual counterparts).
86. See id.
87. See Kenneth A. Kovach & Peter E. Millspaugh, Employment NondiscriminationAct:
On the Cutting Edge of Public Policy, 39 Bus. HORIZONS 65, 67-69 (1996). Yet only 5.7

million people work in a gay friendly company, leaving out the vast majority of the national
work force. See id. at 69.
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morale, loyalty, and productivity, as well as garnering publicity for
the company.8 8
Even though the private sector has taken the lead in providing
employment protection for gays and lesbians, more companies than
not still persist in discriminating against homosexuals.8 9 Therefore,
given this continued exercise of blatant discrimination towards gays
and lesbians, the insufficient enforcement of gay and lesbian
employment rights at the state and local levels, and the refusal by
the federal courts to apply Title VII's anti-sex discrimination provision to sexual orientation discrimination, a federal statute prohibiting such discrimination appears to be the necessary solution to this
serious problem.
B.

CongressionalEffort in Providing Nationwide Uniform
Protectionfor Gays and Lesbians in Employment

In an effort to provide gays and lesbians a uniform nationwide
protection against employment discrimination Congress considered,
for the first time, the Employment Non-Discrimination Act
88. See id at 70; see also The Employment Non-DiscriminationAct, 1996, Hearings on
H.R. 1863 Before the Subcomm. on Government Programsof the House Comm. on Small
Businesses, 104th Cong. 18 (1996) (statement of Patrick McVeigh). Patrick McVeigh is the
Senior Vice President for Franklin Research & Development Corp., a Boston based
investment firm, which manages about half a billion dollars in combined assets for
institutional and individual clients. See id. His main reason for supporting ENDA and
similar employment policies, is that
[n]ondiscrimination policies make good business sense. Businesses with such
policies are better positioned to benefit from the diversity [of a larger and more
qualified pool] of the American work force.
Nondiscrimination policies provide for a heightened sense of security for workers
without imposing hiring goals, recruitment obligations, or other components of
affirmative action programs.
Id.
89. See Kovach & Millspaugh, supra note 87 (stating that a "Wall Street Journal poll of
Fortune 500 CEOs indicated that 66% of them would hesitate to offer a management job to a
homosexual"); Michael Adams, Selling Out, SALES & MARKETInG MoTrr., Oct. 1996, at 78.
The article states that in those areas of business where there is a lot of client contact, such as
sales and marketing, the subject of the client's and the employee's personal lives invariably
arise as part of the rapport such associations call for, (questions such as "are you dating
anyone?" or "what did you do this past weekend?") and therefore in order to maintain such
a relationship and secure whatever business transaction that is being negotiated, the
homosexual employee usually has to lie about his personal life as it pertains to his sexual
orientation. See id. at 78, 81, 82. Even in those companies with sexual orientation as a part
of their non discrimination policies, gay employees must still hide their sexual orientation
from clients who might be offended by it. See id. at 82.
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(ENDA) in the fall of 1996. 9 0 This act would have prohibited sex-

ual orientation discrimination throughout the nation.91 However,
despite national and bipartisan
support, the bill failed passage in
92
the Senate by one vote.

1. Analysis of ENDA's Provisions
Under ENDA, an employer with fifteen or more employees
would be unable to "discriminate against an individual based on the

sexual orientation of persons with whom such individual is believed
to associate or to have associated .....9 Essentially what this sec-

tion of the bill would have done, is prohibit employers from subjecting an individual to a different standard of treatment on the basis of
90. See The Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 1996, H.R. 1863, 104th Cong.
(1995); S. 2056, 104th Cong. (1996); John E. Yang, Senate Passes Bill Against Same Sex
Marriage;In First Test on Hill, Measureto ProhibitEmployment DiscriminationIs Defeated,
50-49, WASH. POST, Sept. 11, 1996, at Al. For other countries that have prohibited sexual

orientation discrimination in the workplace, see Kenneth A. Kovach & Peter E. Millspaugh,
Employment Non Discrimination Act: On the Cutting Edge of Public Policy, 39 Bus.
HORIZONS 65 (1996) (stating that Canada has already prohibited sexual orientation
discrimination through a court decision from its highest court, which held "that the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms (the equivalent to the U.S. Constitution)" covered such
discrimination). The Employment Non-Discrimination Act was first introduced in Congress
in 1994, during the 103rd Congress. See id.
91. See The Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 1996, H.R. 1863, 104th Cong.
(1995); S.2056, 104th Cong. (1996).
92. See The Employment Non-DiscriminationAct, 1996: Hearings on H.R. 1863 Before
the Subcomm. on Government Programs of the House Comm. on Small Businesses, 104th
Cong. 41 (1996) (statement of Elizabeth Birch). Polls conducted by the Human Rights
Campaign, found that 74% of Americans, regardless of political affiliation, supported equal
rights in the workplace for gay and lesbian Americans. See id.at 42. Furthermore, a
Newsweek poll conducted in May of 1996, found that 84% of Americans favored legislation
like ENDA, and in June of the same year, the Associated Press found that 80% were in favor
of ENDA. See id. at 42-43. As recent as 1994, 64% of those people who voted republican in
that year, also stated that they were in favor of employment protection for gay people. See
id. See also Clinton, Gore Renominated as Democratic Candidates at Party Convention in
Chicago-Key Points of the 1996 Democratic Party Platform, FAcTs ON FIE WORLD NEws
DIGEST, Aug. 29, 1996, available in 1996 WL 8621688 (stating that President Clinton
supported ENDA, and promised to sign it, if Congress were to pass it); Statement ofAttorney
GeneralJanet Reno Regarding the Senate's Vote on the Employment Non-DiscriminationAct,
DEPARTMENT OF JuSTICE, Sept. 11, 1996, available in 1996 WL 516041 (stating that U.S.
Attorney General Janet Reno on behalf of the Justice Department, will work with members

of Congress in both parties in the upcoming session, to pass ENDA, further stating that the
closeness of the Senate vote is indicative of growing support to protect all Americans from
unfair employment discrimination).
93. H.R. 1863, 104th Cong. § 2 (1995).
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sexual orientation.94 Moreover, this protection is extended to an
employee's right of actual or perceived association with others of
the same orientation, meaning that even if an employee or applicant is not really homosexual, an employer violates the Act if he/
she fires, hires, or refuses promotion on that basis.95
a. Applicability to Heterogexials and Homosexuals
Sexual orientation is defined in the bill as "homosexuality, bisexuality, or heterosexuality, whether such orientation is real or perceived." 96 As a result, ENDA would not be limited to protecting
only gays and lesbians from sexual orientation employment discrimination. It would have protected heterosexuals as well against sexual orientation discrimination by an employer who discovers that
they either have a homosexual
child or friend, and then proceeds to
97
fire them on that basis.
b. Enforcement of ENDA
Enforcement of ENDA's provisions would be delegated to the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, which was already
commissioned by Title VII to enforce those federally mandated
prohibitions against employment discrimination covered under that
statute.98 The power and authority of the EEOC with respect to its
enforcement of ENDA would also be the same as that already
defined in Title VII.99 Furthermore, ENDA specifically states that
employer coercion or retaliation against employees attempting to
exercise their rights under the Act is prohibited. 100 Finally, pursuant to the 11th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, states would
not be immune to a suit commenced under ENDA, and therefore, a
state employer would not be able to discriminate against employees
because of their sexual orientation. 0 1
94. See The Employment Non-DiscriminationAct, 1996: Hearings on H.R. 1863 Before
the Subcomm. on Government Programs of the House Comm. on Small Businesses, 104th
Cong. 6 (statement of R. Gerry E. Studds).

95. See id. at 7.
96. H.R. 1863, 104th Cong. § 17 (1995).
97. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.

98.
99.
100.
101.

See H.R. 1863, 104th Cong. § 7 (1995).
See id.
See id. at § 11.
See H.R. 1863, 104th Cong. § 9 (1995).
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c. Exceptions to ENDA's Applicability
During the debates and discussion regarding ENDA, there was
much concern about its applicability to religious organizations and
the armed forces."02 However, ENDA would not apply to religious
organizations, as it exempts such organizations from the prohibition
against sexual orientation discrimination. 103 This was a necessary
political maneuver by ENDA's proponents to circumvent the opposition of those organizations, principally religious organizations,
which are vehemently against government recognition of rights for
homosexuals. 0 4 However, the religious organization exemption
does not apply towards "for profit" activities of a religious organization, which are subject to taxation under § 511(b) of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1986.105 Similarly, the armed forces, which
include the army, navy, air force, marines, and coast guard, would
be exempt from ENDA. 0 6 This exemption also includes the allocation of veteran benefits. 0 7
d. The Limitations of ENDA
What ENDA does not do, is compel employers to provide
employment benefits to the domestic partners of gay and lesbian
employees.' 08 ENDA leaves the decision of providing such benefits
up to the individual employer. 0 9 ENDA also is exempt from the
disparate impact theory - the theory that, based on statistics, a company rule or policy discriminates where it disproportionately affects
a member or members of a class protected under legislation without
regard to the employer's lack of intent to discriminate - in the
enforcement provision enunciated above with respect to the
EEOC."0 Furthermore, ENDA specifically prohibits the use of
quotas or preferential treatment towards gays and lesbians for hir102. See Kenneth A. Kovach & Peter E. Millspaugh, Employment Non Discrimination
Act: On the Cutting Edge of Public Policy, 39 Bus. HoRIzoNs 65, 66, 67 (1996).

103. H.R. 1863, 104th Cong. § 6 (1995).
104. See Kenneth A. Kovach & Peter E. Milspaugh, Employment Non Discrimination
Act: On the Cutting Edge of Public Policy, 39 Bus. HORIZONS 65, 66 (1996).

105. See 26 U.S.C. § 511(b) (1997); H.R. 1863, 104th Cong. § 6(b) (1995).
106. See H.R. 1863, 104th Cong. § 7 (1995).
107. See id. at § 9(a)(2).
108. See Kenneth A. Kovach & Peter E. Millspaugh, Employment Non Discrimination
Act: On the Cutting Edge of Public Policy, 39 Bus. HoRIzoNs 65, 66 (1996).
109. See id
110. See H.R. 1863, 104th Cong. § 4 (1995); Kovach & Millspaugh, supra note 108, at 66.
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ing or promotion, a common concern of many opponents of similar
affirmative action programs and policies used to correct the wrongs
previously produced from past discrimination."' Thus, the drafters
of the Act have carefully carved out exceptions to the ban on sexual
orientation discrimination so as to negate likely opposition to it.
2. Arguments Against ENDA and Their Downfalls
Even though ENDA appears to calm the fears of its likely detractors, opposition persists. One of the most typical arguments against
legislation like ENDA has been that it confers "special rights" to
homosexuals, who already enjoy a high standard of living, earning
incomes significantly higher than the average American, and are
one of society's elite groups, thereby negating any need for this
kind of legislation."
This opposing argument is problematic given the real economic
situation of gays and lesbians, and recent developments in the
Supreme Court, which will be discussed below. The average annual
household income for gays and lesbians is about $47,000, and individual income is about $36,000." 3 This simply does not appear to
be the income of an elite group, and it does not necessarily conclude that discrimination against gays and lesbians does not occur in
the workplace simply because of an above average annual
income." 4 For instance, it is plain and obvious that one's salary, no
matter how high it may be, does not protect an individual from discrimination when an employer prospectively discovers the sexual
orientation of the employee, and subsequently fires him or her on
that basis alone. Furthermore, the "special rights" rhetoric of
ENDA opposition has been severely undermined by the U.S.
Supreme Court in its decision in Romer v. Evans." 5
In Romer, the Supreme Court struck down a Colorado state constitutional amendment adopted by referendum, that prohibited the
state of Colorado and its localities from establishing any legislative
111. See H.R. 1863, 104th Cong. § 5 (1995).
112. See The Employment Non-DiscriminationAct, 1996: Hearings on H.R. 1863 Before
the Subcomm. on Government Programs of the House Comm. on Small Businesses, 104th
Cong. 1 (1996) (statement of Joseph Broadus). Joseph Broadus is a professor of law at
George Mason University School of Law. See id.
113. See 142 CoNG. REc. S12,016 (daily ed. Sept. 30,1996) (statement of Sen. Abraham)
(quoting income information collected from Harpers magazine and the Personnel Journal).
114. See id.
115. -U.S. -, 116 S.Ct. 1620 (1996).
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protections based on sexual orientation.1 1 6 The main focus on the
Court's reasoning to strike down this amendment, was that it
denied gay men and lesbians the equal protection of the law as
guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution's 14th Amendment, in that it
did not "bear [a] rational relation to some legitimate end. 11 7 Most
significant for the purposes of this Note, is the Court's statement
with regard to "special rights.' In his opinion, Justice Kennedy
countered arguments based on the "special rights" canard, by saying that:
[w]e find nothing special in the protections Amendment 2 withholds. These are protections taken for granted by most people
either because they already have them or do not need them;
these are protections against exclusion from an almost limitless
number of transactions and endeavors that constitute ordinary
civic life in free society."18

The "rights" which Justice Kennedy spoke of, included the right
to work and seek employment free from sexual orientation discrimination." 9 Thus, in a sweeping statement, the Court dismissed any
"special rights" argument against enacting legislation protecting
people against sexual orientation discrimination in the workplace,
and in effect, recognized homosexuals as a distinct and discriniinated minority class in the U.S. 120
The opposition to ENDA does not stop at arguments involving
special rights. A consistent argument against prohibiting an
employer from discriminating against gays and lesbians, is that it
"essentially takes away the rights of employers to decline to hire or
116. See id. at 1623.
117. Id at 1627. The Court essentially did not find a legitimate state interest in deterring
homosexuality. See id. See also Donna Dennis, Justify Our Love, OurT, Sept. 1996, at 34.
"[T]he court made clear that animosity toward homosexuals is a wholly illegitimate basis for
government action." Id.
118. Romer, 116 S.Ct. at 1627.
119. See id. at 1626.
120. Donna Dennis, Justify Our Love, Our, Sept. 1996, at 36. In his dissenting opinion in
Romer, Justice Scalia argued against striking down Amendment 2, saying that it was "entirely
reasonable" to counteract a great "problem" in the U.S. - the political power of the gay rights
movement. See id. According to the article, the problem arises for Scalia because he
believes that "gay people have 'high disposable income,' possess 'political power much
greater than their numbers,' and enjoy 'enormous influence in American media and
politics."' Id. However, the article keenly points out that "Scalia's argument's about the
disproportionate wealth and cultural elitism of gay people are frighteningly reminiscent of
arguments that were heard about Jews in Nazi Germany in the 1930s." Id.
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promote someone who openly acknowledges indulging in behavior
that the employer or his customers find immoral, unhealthy, and
destructive to individuals, families, and societies,"'' thereby violating the employer's constitutional rights in the areas of freedom of
speech, association and religion. 22 This argument fails, because
there is hardly any logical relationship between an employee's
choice of sexual partners, and his ability to do his job at work.'23
Another argument is that ENDA prohibits an employer from disciplining an employee from engaging in homosexual acts, regardless
of how explicit they may be, which might be injurious to the
employer's business or relationship with clients, or may result in
24
tort liability for the firm, because the bill protects such behavior.
This does not appear to be the case. ENDA does not state at all,
that an employee is protected from disciplinary action by his or her
employer for engaging in sexually explicit behavior at work.
Neither does the legislative history of ENDA indicate that gay and
lesbian employees may engage in sexually explicit behavior at work
with impunity. Rather, ENDA merely states that the employer cannot invoke different standards or treatment on the basis of sexual
orientation, meaning that the employer shall not punish homosexual employees from engaging in such behavior, if heterosexual
employees are not.'25 Therefore, if an employer prohibits heterosexual employees from engaging in sexually explicit behavior, then
it can do so with respect to homosexual employees as well, and punish them if they do, without violating the Act.

121. Kenneth A. Kovach & Peter E. Millspaugh, Employment Non DiscriminationAct:

On the Cutting Edge of Public Policy, 39 Bus. HoRmzoNs 65, 70 (1996).
122. See id
123. See 141 CONG. Ric. S8,501 (daily ed. June 15, 1995) (statement of Sen. Jeffords)
(advocating the proposition that all Americans should be free from discrimination at work
because of personal characteristics unrelated to successful performance on the job). Sen.
Jeffords, the principle Senate sponsor of ENDA, and a senator from Vermont, a state with a
similar statute like ENDA, also stated that no employer in his state has complained about its
ban on sexual orientation discrimination in the workplace, and "the sky has not fallen" there
either. See id. Essentially, the senator is arguing that the fears of many opponents of ENDAlike legislation is unfounded and baseless, given the positive experiences of states like

Vermont. See id
124. See Kenneth A. Kovach & Peter E. Milspaugh, Employment Non Discrimination
Act: On the Cutting Edge of Public Policy, 39 Bus. HomzoNs 65, 71 (1996).

125. See H.R. 1863, 104th Cong. (1995).
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3.

Support for ENDA

Even in the midst of the opposition to ENDA illustrated above,

the bill enjoys support from organized labor,12 6 a number of religious organizations, 2 7 and civil rights groups."' Generally speaking, there are several perspectives that come into play when
discussing those arguments in favor of ENDA. 12 9 Arguments favor-

ing sexual orientation anti-discrimination laws, primarily focus on
handling it as "a civil right, maintaining consistency around the
nation, and [consider] the economic aspects of such legislation."' 30
a. The Civil Rights Perspective in Favor of ENDA

Under the civil rights perspective, proponents of ENDA place
such legislation in the category of civil rights. 13 1 Essentially, under
this rational, sexual orientation should be removed as a basis for job
discrimination in the same way that race, gender, religion, national

origin, age and disabilities have been under Title VII.132 The basis
for such a contention by ENDA supporters, is the "lack of [any]
evidence, scientific or otherwise, that sexual orientation relates to
at work should be directly
job performance,"13 and that "[s]uccess
13 4
related to one's ability to do the job."'

126. See Kenneth A. Kovach & Peter E. Millspaugh, Employment Non Discrimination
Act: On the Cutting Edge of Public Policy, 39 Bus. HoRftONs 65, 69 (1996). Such labor
groups include: the AFL-CIO; Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers; American
Federation of Teachers; the National Education Association; American Association of
Nurses; American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees; and the
International Association of Fire Fighters. See id.
127. See id. Religious groups in support of ENDA are: the National Council of Churches;
Antidefamation League; Presbyterian Church; Disciples of Christ; Episcopal Church;
Evangelical Lutheran Church; Union of Hebrew Congregations; Unitarian Universalistic
Church; and the United Methodist Church. See id.
128. See id. Those civil rights groups that support ENDA include: the ACLU; Leadership
Conference on Civil Rights; U.S. Civil Rights Commission; Women's Legal Defense Fund,
NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund; the Japanese American Citizens League; the
Human Rights Campaign; Lambda Legal Defense Fund; and the National Gay and Lesbian
Task Force. See id.
129. See id. at 69, 70.
130. Id. at 69.
131. See id. at 69.
132. See id.
133. Id.
134. 141 CoNrG. Rnc. S8,502 (daily ed. June 15, 1995) (statement of Sen. Jeffords).
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b. The Consistency Perspective
The consistency perspective in support for ENDA addresses the
fact that there is no uniform, nationwide standard of protection
135
from workplace discrimination based on sexual orientation.
Under this argument, ENDA is necessary because forty-one states
do not provide for their citizens protection from sexual orientation
discrimination in private employment, and in those states and localities that do have such laws, they vary substantially from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. 36 Furthermore, it is also argued that "in those
jurisdictions that have repealed laws that criminalize sodomy, it is
feared that without ENDA a public policy climate that condones
'137
sexual orientation discrimination may be allowed to flourish.
Finally, the consistency argument contends that the current nonuniform state of the law among the various jurisdictions, leaves
some workers less protected or unprotected and thus more vulnerable than others to sexual orientation discrimination in employment. 138 Therefore, as one senator argued, the ultimate result of
this inconsistency, that can be solved with ENDA, is the denial of
the "full and equal protection of the laws promised every American
by the 14th [A]mendment," particularly in the area of employment
for gays and lesbians. 9
c. The Economic Argument
Under an economic perspective, there are two basic rationales
that are advanced in an effort to outlaw sexual orientation discrimination in employment. One addresses the need for a broad pool of
talented prospective employees to draw from, and the other focuses
on the costs related to a continued practice of sexual orientation
discrimination.
135. See Kenneth A. Kovach & Peter E. Milispaugh, Employment Non Discrimination
Act: On the Cutting Edge of Public Policy, 39 Bus. HoRIzoNs 65, 69-70 (1996).

136. See id. at 70; 142 CONG. Rac. S10,130 (daily ed. Sept. 10, 1996) (statement of Sen.
Mosley-Braun).

137. See Kenneth A. Kovach & Peter E. Millspaugh, Employment Non Discrimination
Act: On the Cutting Edge of Public Policy, 39 Bus. HORIZONS 65, 70 (1996).
138. See id

139. See 142 CONG. Rnc. S10,129 (daily ed. Sept. 10, 1996) (statement of Sen. MosleyBraun).
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(1) The Need for Talented Employees
First, as alluded to above, as American companies encounter
greater competition both domestically and globally, employers will
be required to make sure they are recruiting the most qualified
individuals available. 140 Therefore, it would be detrimental to good
business, if American companies intentionally refused to consider a
segment of the "nation's talent pool because of misgivings about
sexual orientation."' 1 It is further insisted, that such discriminating employment practices would thereby "impede our country in
reaching its full economic potential."' 42
(2) The Cost of Discrimination
The second economic argument in favor of ENDA, addresses the
costs associated with sexual orientation discrimination. 143 A study

conducted by the National Commission on Employment Policies to
determine the costs of discrimination to taxpayers, corporations,
and consumers, found that 42,000 gay and lesbian workers are dismissed from their jobs each year because of their sexual orientation. 44 The study concluded that this "translates into a $47 million
loss attributable to training expenditures and unemployment benefits alone."'1 45 Furthermore, even where there is no dismissal, the
study proposed that "productivity from gay and lesbian workers
declines significantly in those work environments hostile to homosexuality.' 46 The final cost of this continued discrimination against
gays and lesbians, to taxpayers, corporations, and consumers,
according to the study, totals to about "$1.4 billion in lost output a
1 47

year."'

Therefore, as the above discussion attempts to prove, ENDA
should be passed because it would provide consistent protection
from employment discrimination for all gay and lesbian Americans.
It is economically more advantageous to the American economy
140. See Kenneth A. Kovach & Peter E. Millspaugh, Employment Non Discrimination
Act: On the Cutting Edge of Public Policy, 39 Bus. HoRIzoN S 65, 70 (1996).

141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

Id.
Id
See id.
See id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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and American businesses, and it is necessary to secure basic civil
rights enjoyed by heterosexual employees for gays and lesbians as
well throughout the nation.
IV.

THE

DEFENSE OF MARRIAGE

ACT

AND ITS POTENTIAL

APPLICATION TO THE FAMILY AND MEDICAL

LEAVE

Acr

Legal marriage between same sex couples is on the brink of reality in Hawaii. 14 8 This development could have a substantial impact

in the employment sphere, because of the number of employment
benefits offered to married couples, and associated with marriage
generally.'4 9 One such benefit would be that gays and lesbians
would have been able to take up to twelve weeks of unpaid leave to
care for a serious ill spouse without losing their job under the Family and Medical Leave Act.' 50 The author says "would have,"
because the passage of the Defense of Marriage Act precludes that
from happening.' 5 ' Before analyzing the potential effect DOMA
would have on FMLA, we must go first to Hawaii, where the state's
highest court has paved the road for the recognition of same sex
marriage there. 52
A.

Baehr v. Lewin

In Baehr v. Lewin,'53 several same sex couples who were denied
marriage licenses from the state's Department of Health, brought
suit against that department's commissioner to compel the depart148. See David L. Chambers, What If? The Legal Consequences of Marriage and the
Legal Needs of Lesbian and Gay Male Couples, 95 MICH. L. REv. 447 (1996); Baehr v. Lewin,
852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993); Baehr v. Miike,-P.2d -, 1996 WL 694235 (Haw. Ct. App. 1996).
See also U.S. CoNsT. art. IV, § 1. "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the
public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State." Id. Under this article
of the U.S. Constitution, a marriage in Hawaii would normally be recognized by any other
state which the couple may enter, absent a statue like the DOMA, which permits the states to
not recognize gay marriages from other states. See 1 U.S.C. § 7 (1996).
149. See generally Chambers, supra note 148, at 447 (discussing how the disparate
treatment between married persons and unmarried persons in law has an impact in all fields
of social regulation).
150. See 29 U.S.C. § 2612 (a)(1)(C) (1996).
151. See supra note 13 and accompanying text. The Defense of Marriage Act allows
states not to recognize same sex marriages from other states, a debate beyond the scope of
this Note.
152. See Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993).
153. Id.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol15/iss1/6

24

1997]

Putignano: Why DOMA
and Not ENDA?: A Review of Recent Federal Hostility to E
Why DOMA and not ENDA?

ment to issue their marriage licenses.' 54 In 1993, the case went to
the Hawaii State Supreme Court, which reversed the lower court's
decision to affirm the denial, and remanded the case to the appellate division with special instructions. 55 The Court held that in the
lower proceedings, the state's Department of Health must prove
that the state's sex-based marriage law's limitation on the right of
marriage to male-female couples, is supported by a compelling state
interest, as is required by Hawaii's state constitution, in order to
continue denying same-sex couples marriage licenses. 5 6

Upon remand in Baehr v. Miike, 57 the court upheld the same-sex
marriages at issue, citing to the dissenting opinion in Dean v. District of Columbia5 8 as the basis for its holding, which stated:
[A] mere feeling of distaste or even revulsion at what someone
else is or does, simply because it offends majority values without
causing concrete harm, cannot justify inherently discriminatory
legislation against members of a congtitutionally protected
class-as the history of constitutional
rulings against racially dis159
criminatory legislation makes clear.

Essentially, the Hawaiian court held that the evidence by the
State did not "establish or prove that same sex marriage will result
in prejudice or harm to an important public or governmental interest."'160 Nor did the state demonstrate a compelling state interest
sufficient to justify withholding the legal status of marriage from the
plaintiffs.161 Specifically, the court determined that the state failed
to show any evidence that "the public interest in the well-being of
children and families, or the optimal development of children
154. See id.
155. See id.
156. See id. at 68. In Hawaii, marriage laws which operate on sex based classifications,
are subject to strict scrutiny, by virtue of the state's constitution, which says that sex based
classifications will be permitted, upon a showing of compelling interest by the state for such a
classification. See id. In this case, the marriage law limiiing marriage to only couples of
opposite sex, is such a sex based classification, and therefore, is presumed unconstitutional,
until the state can prove a compelling interest as to why marriage should be restricted to only
male and female couples. See id.
157. -P.2d -, 1996 WL 694235, at *1 (Haw. Ct. App. 1996).
158. 653 A.2d 307 (D.C. App. 1995). Two gay men sued the District of Columbia for
refusing to give them a marriage license because they were of the same sex. See id.
159. -P.2d -, 1996 WL 694235, at *21 (Haw. Ct. App. 1996) (quoting Dean v. District
of Columbia, 653 A.2D 307, 355 (D.C. App. 1995) (Ferren J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part)).
160. -P.2d -, 1996 WL 694235, at *21 (Ha w. Ct. App. 1996).
161. See id.
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would be adversely affected by same-sex marriage."' 62 As a result,
the Court held that the state's marriage law is unconstitutional, and
directed the state to grant marriage licenses to same-sex couples. 163
However, the order of the court was enjoined pending further
appeal back to the State Supreme Court, which is not expected to
hand down its final decision until 1998, although an affirming decision is widely anticipated." 6
B.

CongressionalPreemption of Hawaii'sPotential Legalization
of Same-Sex Marriage: The Defense of MarriageAct
As a direct result of the Hawaii decision, Congress passed the
Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), in order to estop its applicability to all acts and laws of the United States.' 65 The terms "spouse"
and "marriage," which are found in 3900 sections of the United
States Code, were left undefined before DOMA. 16 6 When inter-

preting those sections, the relevant state definition was used to fill
in the gap.' 6 7 However, because of the development in Hawaii,
Congress would have had to apply a number of federal employment
benefits, such as the Family and Medical Leave Act, 68 to same sex
couples who marry if Hawaii finally sanctions such marriages. 69
Therefore, one can safely assume, that Congress passed DOMA to
preclude that effect, by specifically defining the terms "marriage"
and "spouse" in a way that applies all federal employment statutes
only to married couples of the opposite sex.' 7 °

1. The Defense of Marriage Act as it Pertains to The Family
and Medical Leave Act
The legislative history of DOMA actually focuses on the FMLA
as a reason why it should be passed. 7 ' The DOMA House Report
162. Id.

163. See id. at *22.
164. See H.R. REP. No. 104-664, at 5 (1996).
165. See id. at 6.
166. See id. at 10.
167. See id.
168. Although FMLA defines the term spouse as a "husband or wife, as the case may
be," the male spouse of a gay "married" couple would be considered his husband, and
thereby be entitled to the twelve weeks of unpaid leave FMLA provides for. See 29 U.S.C.
§ 2611 (13) (1996).

169. See id.
170. See 1 U.S.C. § 7 (1996).
171. H.R. REP. No. 104-664, at 11 (1996).
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indicates that when the FMLA was originally drafted, the term
spouse was not defined. 172 However, an amendment was added
defining the term spouse to mean "only a husband or wife as the
case may be."'7 The report also stresses that the DOMA is needed
in light of this definition, which does not define husband nor wife,
in order to restrict application of the FMLA to only traditional
married heterosexual couples. 74 Furthermore, the report stresses,
that without limiting the definition of spouse to married couples,
the FMLA would invite lawsuits by workers who unsuccessfully
seek leave on the basis of a serious illness of their unmarried adult
companions. 75 DOMA further limits the potential for such lawsuits by narrowing that definition even more to spouses of the
opposite sex. 17 6 Another motive for narrowing the applicability of
the FMLA to only heterosexual married couples, is to preserve
scarce government resources, such as employment benefits. 7 7
Since a disproportionate number of HIV infected people are homosexuals, 7 8 it is expected that many married gay couples would seek
leave under FMLA to care for their HIV infected partner. Yet, as
was alluded to above, the DOMA precludes this from ever
happening.
2. Arguments Against the Limiting Effect of DOMA's Section
Defining "Marriage" and "Spouse"
There are two basic arguments against DOMA which the author
terms the "Ineffective Legislation Argument," and the "Purpose
Frustration Argument." The first argument focuses on one reason
why Congress passed DOMA, and the other argument focuses on
how DOMA frustrates the general purpose of the FMLA.
a. The Ineffective Legislation Argument
Although Congress hopes that DOMA will limit litigation in the
U.S., it is interesting to point out that DOMA may actually increase
172. See id.
173. Id.
174. See id.
175. See id.
176. See id.
177. See id. at 12.
178. See John Douglas, HIV Disease and Disparate Impact Under the Americans With
DisabilitiesAc A FederalProhibitionof Discriminationon the Basis of Sexual Orientation?
16 BERKELEY J. Eiw,. & LAB. L. 288, 293-94 (1995).
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aggregate litigation in this already litigious nation. After Hawaii
legalizes same-sex marriage, it is not difficult to imagine that many
gay and lesbian couples will go there to wed, and then return home
to their respective states, or even remain in Hawaii to ensure the
recognition of their marriage. Furthermore, it is equally likely that
a number of these newly-weds will attempt to take advantage of the
benefits outlined in the FMLA. The inevitable result, because of
DOMA, will be the denial of their leave, which in turn may ignite
an incendiary flame of more litigation by these people to enforce
their rights under the FMLA. Thus, it seems that one of DOMA's
main purposes to limit litigation, may in fact be counter-productive,
thereby characterizing it as ineffective legislation.
b. The Purpose Frustration Argument
Furthermore, it seems that the general purpose for the FMLA is
frustrated by DOMA. One of the listed purposes of the FMLA is
to "entitle employees to take reasonable leave ... for the care of
a... spouse... who has a serious health condition."' 7 9 Yet DOMA

arbitrarily distinguishes the necessity of taking time off to care for a
sick heterosexual married partner, as opposed to a homosexual
married partner. The need to care for both is obvious and apparent, whether it is for a lesbian wife to care for her sick lesbian wife,
or for a heterosexual husband to care for his heterosexual wife.
However, as much as DOMA seems to run contrary with the plain
language of the.FMLA's purposes, in actuality, it does not when
one considers the legislative history of that act. 180 Nonetheless, if
Congress explicitly wanted to limit the term spouse in the FMLA to
only members of the opposite sex, why did it not do so in the first
place when it was enacted, since it was an issue in the debates leading up to its passage in 1993?181 DOMA, it appears, answers that

question by providing for such a narrow definition, at the expense
of many gay and lesbian couples who will get married in Hawaii,
after the state's highest court legalizes their same-sex marriages.

179. 29 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(2) (1996).
180. See 139 CONG. REC. H. 555 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 1993 (statement of Rep. Kyl) (saying
that the term spouse in the FMLA means a married man and a married woman).
181. See id.
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V.

CONCLUSION

As the beginning of this Note indicates, the fight for a federal
foothold by gays and lesbians in securing employment rights against
sexual orientation discrimination has met great opposition, both in
the federal courts and the legislature. Although provided protection against such discrimination in several states, and by a number
of private businesses, discrimination against gays and lesbians persists with impunity. Furthermore, whatever protection is provided,
it is neither uniform in its availability or application, nor effective in
its enforcement. Thus, a federal nationwide ban on such discrimination is necessary. Another attempt at achieving that result, has
already arisen in the 105th Congress, where legislation identical in
substance to the Employment Non-Discrimination Act, was introduced in the House of Representatives in January of 1997.182 As

was demonstrated above, such a law is practical in terms of economics and basic human rights. It does not compel the populace to
condone homosexual behavior, nor favor homosexuals when considering them for employment. Instead, ENDA would mandate
that like race, sex, national origin, and disability, sexual orientation
has no bearing on one's ability to work; an employer3 should only
judge an employee based on his or her own merits.1
In addition, the passage of the Defense of Marriage Act, facilitates a "separate and unequal" atmosphere for all gays and lesbians
who marry after Hawaii sanctions same sex marriages, by denying
them the rights granted to married heterosexuals under the Family
and Medical Leave Act. The arbitrary distinction the Defense of
Marriage Act places by virtue of its definition section, will leave
many gay and lesbian couples without any basis for taking leave
from their employment in order to care for their seriously ill husband or wife. Therefore, in order to correct this Congressional
oversight, a repeal of the definition section of the Defense of Mar182. See The Civil Rights Amendments Act of 1998, H.R. 365, 105th Cong. (1997).
183. See 142 CONG. REc. S10134-35 (daily ed. Sept. 10, 1996) (statement of Sen.
Kennedy).
America will only be America when we free ourselves from discrimination, and [the

Employment Non Discrimination Act], carefully crafted, tries to say, "If you work
in America, if you have the ability to work, you can work and you ought to be

judged on your ability to work and not on the issues of sexual orientation." That is
the case.
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riage Act, or an amendment that will exclude its application to the
Family and Medical Leave Act, is necessary.
There is no doubt that when Thomas Jefferson proclaimed in
1776 in the Declaration of Independence, "We hold these truths to
be self evident, that all men are created equal,"'" he and the other
Framers of our nation did not even contemplate the employment
rights of homosexuals. 185 However, as Supreme Court Justice Ruth
Bader Ginsburg so eloquently argued, many of the rights which
Americans enjoy today (such as a women's inalienable right to
vote, abortion rights, and a number of civil rights), although inconceivable by the Framers, 86 nonetheless eventually came to fruition
in, the 20th Century. It seems therefore, that the Framers' initial
inconceivability of a certain class of rights, did not serve well to
block their preservation. As this Note has attempted to illustrate,
the time has arrived that the "inalienable" employment rights of
homosexuals, also initially not conceived by the Framers, be preserved for the thousands of gay and lesbian Americans who are to
this day denied the "truths" of that great document which gave
birth to this nation.
Pat P. Putignano

184.
185.
1185-88
186.

See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776).
See Ginsburg, Ruth Bader, Speaking in a Judicial Voice, 67 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1185,
(1992).
See id. at 1202-1209.
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